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We delineate a theory of communicative acts as situated ac-
tions, through which agents co-construct the current situation 
by creating or otherwise manipulating deontic affordances. 
We rely on Gilbert’s theory of plural subjects to introduce the 
concept of joint meaning as a type of joint commitment. We 
then show that our approach allows for an innovative treat-
ment of indirect speech. 
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Introduction 
Language is an indispensable tool for human interaction. If 
what we are interested in is the relationship between what is 
said, the mental representations entertained by the interact-
ing agents, and the situation in which the interaction is car-
ried out, there is no doubt that a fundamental contribution 
has been given by Speech Act Theory. After entering the 
Cognitive Science world in the late Nineteen-seventies (Co-
hen & Perrault, 1979), models based on Speech Act Theory 
have been worked out to deal with language understanding 
(Allen, 1983), language generation (Appelt, 1985), dialogi-
cal exchanges (Airenti et al., 1993), and so forth. 
Already in the early Nineteen-eighties, however, Stephen 
Levinson (1981) argued that Speech Act Theory is inher-
ently inadequate to account for real communicative interac-
tions; more recently, Herbert Clark (1996) criticized Speech 
Act Theory for neglecting the intrinsic participatory nature 
of communication; and Jacob Mey (2001), to make another 
example, insists on the need to replace the concept of a 
speech act with the concept of a pragmatic act, because in 
general the communicative contribution of an utterance can-
not be reduced to a well-identified illocutionary act, not 
even if the notion of an indirect speech act is brought into 
play.  
Scholars who express discontent with Speech Act Theory 
often defend a situated approach to linguistic communica-
tion (Mey, 2001). The idea is that the communicative con-
tribution of an utterance can be understood only if the over-
all situation in which the interaction takes place is taken into 
account. However, this type of claims are more of a research 
program than a fully-fledged theory: in our opinion, no sat-
isfactory treatment of what it means for a communicative 
interaction to be situated has been developed yet. 
In this paper we submit what we take to be a step to a the-
ory of situated communicative interactions. In our view, the 
situations in which interactions take place are partly given 
and partly collectively constructed by the agents themselves 
during the interaction. A crucial aspect of a situation, from 
the point of view of communication, is its deontic compo-
nent, which can be treated in terms of joint commitments 
(Gilbert, 1996, 2000, 2006). Basically, we suggest that an 
agent’s communicative acts may be regarded as actions that 
enrich the current situation with new deontic affordances, 
which can be accepted, rejected of further negotiated by the 
other agents. According to this view, a substantial compo-
nent of the force of a communicative act lies in its power to 
enrich or modify the network of commitments that bind the 
interacting agents. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we 
defend a situated and deontic approach to communicative 
acts; in particular we introduce Gilbert’s concept of a joint 
commitment and analyze its relationship with communica-
tion. In the following section we show how our approach 
can be applied to deal with an important aspect of commu-
nication, namely indirect speech. Finally, in the last section 
we draw some conclusions and delineate possible directions 
for further research. 
Situated Communicative Acts 
If communication is to be understood within a situation, 
what is a situation? Obviously, the physical setting is impor-
tant; moreover, the context in which an interaction is carried 
out is crucial to set the values of such indexicals as now, 
tomorrow, here, I, and so on. But all this is only going to 
play a marginal role, if any, in determining the communica-
tive force of an utterance. 
It is widely accepted that situations are best regarded as 
sources of affordances (Gibson, 1979; Norman, 1988; Ca-
rassa et al., 2005), that is, of action possibilities that are per-
ceived by the agents. Such affordances may exist in a situa-
tion before the agents start to carry out an interaction. More 
interestingly, agents often produce new affordances that 
enrich the current situation. Consider for example Ann and 
Bob walking in a wood in search of mushrooms; suddenly 
Ann, who at the moment is somewhat far from Bob, shouts, 
 (1)  “Hey, there are some gorgeous ones here!” 
This utterance may be interpreted as a “pushmi-pullyu” 
communicative act (Millikan, 1996), to wit, as a communi-
cative act that is at the same time an instance of informing 
(an assertive) and one of inviting (a directive). But this 
would leave out an important part of the story. After pro-
ducing Utterance 1, it would be inappropriate for Ann to 
walk away, without waiting for Bob to reach her; if she did 
so, Bob would be entitled to complain and to ask for an ex-
planation (“Why didn’t you wait for me?”). To explain this 
fact we may assume that Utterance 1 also has a commissive 
force: if Ann invites Bob to join her at place X, she has to 
stay at X until Bob either reaches her at X or rejects her invi-
tation. Finally, it is easy to imagine Ann producing Utter-
ance 1 in a jubilant tone, thus expressing a feeling of joy. 
According to this analysis, Utterance 1 appears to be sig-
nificantly overloaded, realizing at the same time an asser-
tive, a directive, a commissive, and an expressive act. Ra-
ther than being an exception, however, a case like this 
seems to be the rule. Indeed, every directive act involves a 
commissive component; for example, if Bob asks Ann to 
bring him a cup of coffee, he thereby commits to wait for 
the cup of coffee to be brought by Ann, to accept it, and (at 
least in normal conditions) to drink it: any deviation from 
this pattern of behavior would have to be justified. Symmet-
rically, commissive acts typically include a directive com-
ponent; for example, if Ann says to her father 
 (2)  “I’ll come visit next Sunday,” 
then Ann is not only making a promise, she is also implic-
itly asking her father to stay at home next Sunday to wel-
come her. 
A first consequence of these considerations is that it may 
be sensible to abandon the idea that a communicative act be 
classified as an assertive, or a directive, and so on. A better 
choice may be to assume that, in general, communicative 
acts serve several functions at the same time: an assertive 
function, a directive function, a commissive function, and 
an expressive function. But why is it the case that a single 
communicative act tends to serve different functions? The 
answer, we believe, is to be found in the way communica-
tive acts combine with the overall situation in which human 
interactions are carried out. 
In a forthcoming paper (Carassa & Colombetti, to appear) 
we argue that communicative acts should be regarded as 
actions that produce deontic affordances, to wit, the oppor-
tunity for the hearer(s) to enter a deontic relationship with 
the speaker. More precisely, communicative acts typically 
produce precommitments, which can then be turned into 
joint commitments by suitable reactions. The concept of a 
joint commitment, that we consider as fundamental for a 
situated approach to communication, has been introduced 
and extensively analyzed by Margaret Gilbert. Here we can 
only sketch the crucial features of this concept; for an exten-
sive treatment we refer the interested reader to Gilbert’s 
works (in particular Gilbert 1996, Part III; 2000, Chapter 4; 
and 2006, Chapter 7). 
Gilbert’s concept of a joint commitment 
According to Gilbert all genuinely collective phenomena 
(like joint activities, collective beliefs, group feelings, social 
conventions, and so on) involve a special kind of commit-
ment, that she calls a joint commitment. A subject may be 
personally committed to do X, for example as a result of an 
individual decision: such a decision may be rescinded, but 
until this does not happen the subject is committed to do X. 
Being committed to do X is a desire-independent reason 
(although in general not a sufficient cause) for the subject to 
do X; however, in the case of a personal commitment the 
subject is the only ‘owner’ of the commitment, and can re-
scind it as he or she pleases. Contrary to personal commit-
ments, a joint commitment is a commitment of two or more 
subjects, called the parties of the joint commitment, to en-
gage in a common project ‘as a single body.’ The main dif-
ference between personal and joint commitments is that 
joint commitments are not separately owned by their parties, 
but they are, so to speak, collectively owned by all parties at 
the same time. 
In view of the purpose of this article, the main features of 
joint commitments are that: (i) they are desire-independent 
reasons for action that are intentionally created by agents in 
interaction; and (ii), they consist of deontic relationships 
between the parties, more specifically of directed obliga-
tions with their correlative rights and entitlements. If a 
group is jointly committed to do something, then every par-
ty is obligated to all other parties to do his or her part of the 
joint activity, and has the right that all other parties do their 
parts. It is characteristic of joint commitments that all such 
obligations are created simultaneously, and are interdepend-
ent in the sense that each party is bound by the joint com-
mitment only as long as the other parties are so bound. If 
and when all its obligations are fulfilled, a joint commitment 
is itself fulfilled; on the contrary, if one of its obligations is 
violated, the joint commitment is violated (which, in many 
cases, implies that the joint commitment ceases to exist). 
The content of a joint commitment need not be a collec-
tive action: a group of subjects may commit to holding a 
certain type of attitude, like a belief, a desire, a disposition, 
a feeling, and so on. As we shall see, joint commitments to 
beliefs (also called group beliefs by Gilbert) are particularly 
interesting for our current goal. A few observations are im-
portant here. First, all joint commitments, inclusive of 
commitments to beliefs, are desire-independent reasons for 
action. To give an example, suppose that Ann and Bob 
jointly commit to believing that drinking coffee is bad for 
one’s health; later on, they will have to behave in certain 
ways, or else their commitment will be violated. Second, 
joint commitment to a belief should not be confused with 
what is usually called common belief or mutual belief in the 
Cognitive Science literature: in particular it is possible for a 
group of agents to be jointly committed to believing that p, 
while it is common belief of the same group that not-p. The 
reason is again that joint commitments are reasons for ac-
tion: being jointly committed to believing that p just means 
that the parties are committed to behaving in ways that are 
compatible with such a belief; what the parties actually be-
lieve is a logically independent issue. 
It follows from these considerations that fulfilling or vio-
lating a joint commitment is logically independent of sincer-
ity. If a subject acts coherently with a commitment, then the 
commitment is fulfilled even if the subject was insincere 
about his or her beliefs, desires, and so on; and if a subject 
does not act coherently with a commitment, then the com-
mitment is violated even if the subject was sincere. Of 
course there are often moral reasons for being sincere, but 
this has nothing to do with the obligations of joint commit-
ment. 
Joint commitment and communication 
Joint commitments have a puzzling feature: while they 
come into force at a specific moment (at which they create 
simultaneous and interdependent directed obligations of all 
the parties), they are the cumulative result of an incremental 
process of collective construction. A joint commitment can-
not be created by a single member of a group: what is 
needed is an overt ‘offer’ of every agent to participate in 
creating the joint commitment. 
In our view, situations of interaction are related to joint 
commitments in two distinct ways. First, at any moment the 
current situation may afford an agent the possibility to offer 
to some other agents the opportunity of building a new joint 
commitment. Second, such an offer is itself a new affor-
dance, more precisely a deontic affordance, which is created 
by an agent to be exploited by the others. Therefore, by per-
forming a communicative act, an agent both exploits the 
current situation and enriches it with new deontic affor-
dances. 
Let us go back to the mushroom gathering example. Be-
fore Ann produces Utterance 1, the situation is already 
shaped by deontic relationships binding Ann and Bob: in a 
typical case Ann and Bob will have agreed to go searching 
for mushrooms together, and will therefore be bound by a 
joint commitment to this effect. This type of activity, when 
performed collectively, normally includes certain practices, 
like helping each other to gather mushrooms from the same 
patch, when the agents are lucky enough to find a rich one. 
Now, Ann’s uttering “Hey, there are some gorgeous ones 
here!” can be seen to disclose a deontic affordance for Bob, 
which is now in a position to accept (or refuse, or further 
negotiate) Ann’s offer. In a sense, Ann’s communicative act 
produces ‘a half’ of a joint commitment (which, more tech-
nically, we call a precommitment): Bob is thereby called to 
produce the other half, of to reject the offer (with some mo-
tivation). 
In view of this analysis, we think that classifying Ann’s 
communicative act as an assertion that indirectly realizes an 
invitation would miss the point. What Ann really does is to 
introduce a new element in the current situation; such an 
element is a deontic affordance, namely the possibility for 
Bob to create a new joint commitment with Ann. 
Joint meaning and joint projects 
We suggest that communicative acts generate two levels of 
deontic affordances, roughly corresponding to the illocu-
tionary and perlocutionary levels of analysis of Speech Act 
Theory. At the ‘illocutionary’ level, the speaker creates a 
deontic affordance for the formation of joint meaning (Ca-
rassa & Colombetti, to appear1); at the ‘perlocutionary’ lev-
el, the speaker creates a deontic affordance for engaging in a 
joint project (Clark, 1996). 
It has often been observed that the meaning of a commu-
nicative act appears to be at least partially undetermined 
until the hearer takes it up. Consider the following conversa-
tion, occurring at a dinner party: 
(3)  Ann: “I feel sleepy.” 
(4)  Bob: “I’ll get you another cup of coffee.” 
(5)  Ann: “Thank you, Bob.” 
Now suppose that Ann’s original statement was intended as 
an indirect invitation to leave the party. Bob’s reply rede-
fines it as something different (i.e., as an indirect request to 
receive some help in dealing with the fact of feeling asleep). 
Finally, Ann accepts Bob’s redefinition. We may wonder 
whether Bob correctly understood Ann’s original invitation 
(and decided to ignore it), or was really mistaken in his in-
terpretation. In a concrete situation it may be impossible for 
Ann to establish what went on in Bob’s mind. But in any 
case after the exchange Ann and Bob have reached an 
agreement on the meaning of Utterance 3: independently of 
Ann’s original communicative intention, the utterance has 
been accepted as an indirect request to receive some sup-
port. In our view, Ann and Bob have now achieved joint 
meaning of such an utterance. 
Joint meaning is a special case of a joint commitment to a 
belief: more precisely, it is the joint commitment (of the 
speaker and the hearer) to the belief that the speaker per-
formed a communicative act of a certain type. All commu-
nicative acts produce a first-level, ‘illocutionary’ deontic 
affordance, namely the opportunity for the hearer to form a 
joint meaning with the speaker. But communicative acts 
typically produce also a second-level, ‘perlocutionary’ de-
ontic affordance, namely the opportunity for the hearer to 
engage in a joint project with the speaker. In our example, 
by Utterance 4 Bob not only proposes to understand Utter-
ance 3 as a request for support, but also accepts such a re-
quest: after the exchange Ann and Bob are jointly commit-
ted to carrying out a specific joint project, in which Bob 
brings a cup of coffee to Ann and Ann drinks it.  
The deontic dimension of communication is, we believe, 
essential to understand the actual force of communicative 
acts. It is important to remark that we do not propose to 
drop the more traditional explanations, based on epistemic 
and volitional mental states like beliefs and intentions; ra-
                                                          
1 In the referenced paper we further justify our definition of joint 
meaning as a joint commitment by relating the creation of a 
commitment to the view that communicative intentions are re-
flexive, in the sense clarified, among others, by Bach & Harnish 
(1979). 
ther, we suggest that also the deontic dimension should be 
taken into account, with its possible relationships with be-
liefs and intentions. In the next section we show that doing 
so allows one to explain some problematic aspects of indi-
rect speech. 
The Deontic Structure of Indirect Speech 
Any attempt to use Speech Act Theory to model a real con-
versation immediately faces a problem: most often, the lit-
eral illocutionary act performed through the production of 
an utterance does not account for its full communicative 
force. The standard approach to solve this difficulty relies 
on the concept of an indirect illocutionary act (Searle, 
1975). The idea is that an utterance, besides realizing a lit-
eral illocutionary act, may realize a further indirect illocu-
tionary act. The paradigmatic example is the by now famous 
“Can you reach the salt?”, whose standard interpretation is 
that a request of passing the salt (e.g., during a social din-
ner) is realized indirectly, for politeness’ sake, through a 
question concerning a preparatory condition of the request. 
Searle’s view of indirect speech acts is that they retain 
their literal illocutionary force, but add a further illocution-
ary force, which can be reconstructed inferentially by rea-
soning under assumptions of conversational cooperation. 
This approach to indirect speech, however, runs into several 
difficulties. First (as already remarked by Levinson, 1981), 
an indirect speech act does not always retain its literal force. 
Second, many (if not most) utterances in real conversations 
appear to realize a complex set of different indirect speech 
acts, which are not always related to the literal illocutionary 
act in a simple way (e.g., through a constitutive condition of 
the indirect illocutionary act, like in the salt passing exam-
ple). Third, it is unclear why indirect speech should be so 
pervasive, given that politeness cannot always be invoked as 
an explanation. 
Basically, we are left with the problem of explaining why 
indirect speech appears to be a standard way for people to 
communicate. In a recent paper, Pinker and colleagues ana-
lyze some cases of indirect speech, most of which go be-
yond issues of politeness; as the authors put it (Pinker et al., 
2008:833), 
“People often ... veil their intentions in innuendo, euphe-
mism, or doublespeak. Here are some familiar examples: 
– Would you like to come up and see my etchings? [a 
sexual come-on] 
– If you could pass the guacamole, that would be awe-
some. [a polite request] 
– Nice store you got there. Would be a real shame if 
something happened to it. [a threat] 
– We’re counting on you to show leadership in our 
Campaign for the Future. [a solicitation for a dona-
tion] 
– Gee, officer, is there some way we could take care of 
the ticket here? [a bribe]” 
The authors propose an explanation of indirect speech based 
on three points: plausible deniability, relationship negotia-
tion, and language as a digital medium. We shall now ana-
lyze the two following examples in the light of our approach 
based on the concept of deontic affordance: 
(6) “Gee, officer, is there some way we could take care of 
the ticket here?” 
(7) “Nice store you got there. Would be a real shame if 
something happened to it.” 
Deliberate ambiguity 
In many situations, an offer to engage in an illegal transac-
tion has to be disguised, so that “plausible deniability” is 
assured. Pinker and colleagues, however, do not clarify what 
“denying” means in such a situation. To present our pro-
posal, let us consider a direct alternative to Utterance 6, like 
for example: 
(6’) “Officer, I’ll give you 20 bucks if you forget about 
this ticket.” 
Utterance 6’ creates a deontic affordance for the policeman, 
who can now accept or refuse a bribe. Unfortunately, if the 
policeman refuses to take up the deontic affordance, he may 
arrest the car driver on the charge of attempting to bribe 
him. The speaker is thus in a difficult situation: if her pro-
posal is accepted, everything will go fine; but if the proposal 
is rejected, she may get into troubles. 
In what sense is the situation created by Utterance 6 dif-
ferent? As we said in the previous section, we suggest that: 
at the ‘illocutionary’ level, the speaker creates a deontic 
affordance for the hearer to participate in the production of 
joint meaning; at the ‘perlocutionary’ level, the speaker cre-
ates a deontic affordance for the hearer to engage in a joint 
project with the speaker. With Utterance 6’, the bribing pro-
ject is overtly proposed by the car driver, and the policeman 
may just accept or reject it (with possible troubles for the 
speaker, in the latter case). With Utterance 6, on the con-
trary, the car driver leaves it to the policemen to specify her 
utterance, as a matter of joint meaning, as the proposal of a 
bribing project. Now the policeman has a choice. First, he 
may pretend he did not understand that a bribe has been 
proposed; for example he may answer, 
“Well, you are entitled to a reduced fine if you pay within 
three days.” 
Second, he may take up Utterance 6 as an indirect bribe, and 
accept the joint project. Third, he may take up Utterance 6 
as an indirect bribe, and reject the joint project. But in this 
case the car driver has still room for maneuver, because she 
can deny that a bribe has been offered. 
Utterance 6 is an example of a communicative strategy 
that may be called deliberate ambiguity. Such a strategy 
involves producing deontic affordances that are inherently 
open, in the sense that the speaker leaves it to the hearer to 
complete their definition (after which they can still be ac-
cepted, refused, or otherwise negotiated). Other examples, 
however, cannot be interpreted in this way, because they do 
not involve the speaker’s attempt to leave it open for the 
hearer to give a substantial contribution to the definition of 
joint meaning. We analyze one such example in the next 
subsection. 
The collective construction of situations 
Utterance 7 clearly evokes a situation in which the speaker, 
as a member of some criminal organization, threatens a 
shopkeeper of burning her shop to ashes if she refuses to 
pay protection money. The difference with the previous 
example is that, although the threat is indirect, the speaker 
does not intend to leave it open for the hearer to interpret it 
as something else. In other words, Utterance 7 cannot be 
viewed as a case of deliberate ambiguity. Why is the speak-
er using indirect speech, then? Is he trying to be polite? 
Given the situation, this interpretation would at least sound 
doubtful. 
The explanation offered by Pinker and colleagues relies 
on the fact that “language is tacitly perceived to be a digital 
medium” (p. 836). As a consequence, “overt propositions 
are perceived as certain and act as focal points, whereas 
implicatures from indirect speech are perceived as being 
some measure short of certainty” (p. 837). We find this ex-
planation highly implausible, because in the case of Utter-
ance 7 there is actually no room for uncertainty, no matter 
how digital a medium language is assumed to be. 
Our alternative explanation relies on the crucial fact that 
joint meaning, being a joint commitment, may well conflict 
with what is common belief of the speaker and the hearer. 
We view the communicative act of Utterance 7 as resulting 
into the following state of affairs: 
– it is common belief of the speaker and the hearer that 
the utterance conveys a threat; 
– the speaker proposes that the hearer accept as joint 
meaning that the speaker is offering a useful service to 
the shopkeeper, in exchange of a fair payment. 
Of course, neither the speaker nor the hearer really believe 
that a fair transaction is being proposed. But this is exactly 
what is being suggested as a matter of joint meaning. To 
clarify this point, consider three possible answers by the 
shopkeeper: 
(8) “True, safety is important. Could you take care of 
that?” 
(8’) [handling a big gun] “Do you really think I’m run-
ning any serious risk?” 
(8”) “You don’t scare me, get off my store right away or 
I’ll call the police.” 
With Utterance 8, the shopkeeper accepts both the joint 
meaning and the joint project proposed by the speaker. With 
Utterance 8’, the joint meaning is accepted, but the joint 
project is refused. Finally, with Utterance 8” both the joint 
meaning and the joint project are refused. 
Utterances 6 and 7 have an important feature in common: 
in both cases the speaker invites the hearer to co-construct a 
fictitious project that is different (and in a sense more ‘ele-
gant’) than the one which is actually being proposed. In the 
first case, the bribing project is disguised as a act of kind-
ness that the policeman may be willing to do to the car driv-
er; in the second case, the request for money is disguised as 
a fair compensation due for a valuable service. In both cas-
es, the speaker invites the hearer to jointly commit to a rep-
resentation of the current situation that is different from 
what the same situation is understood to be as a matter of 
common belief. This entails no logical contradiction be-
cause, as we have remarked in Section 2.1, a group may be 
jointly committed to believing that p even if not-p is com-
mon belief of the same group: the joint commitment, if suc-
cessfully created, will be a desire-independent reason for the 
members of the group to act coherently with the belief that 
p, even if all members actually believe that not-p and this is 
common belief. Indeed, we think that this is the key to un-
derstanding indirect speech. 
Between Utterance 6 and 7 there is also a difference, in 
that the former, contrary to the latter, is intended to leave it 
open for the hearer to further specify it as a proposal of a 
certain type of joint project. This difference is justified by 
the asymmetric allocation of power between the speaker and 
the hearer in the pre-existing situations: in the bribing ex-
ample, the policeman has the (actual) power to withdraw the 
ticket, as well as the (legal) power to charge the driver of 
attempting to bribe him; in the protection money example, 
the gangster has the (actual) power of causing serious trou-
bles if the shopkeeper refuses to pay. This explains why the 
car driver, but not the gangster, relies on deliberate ambigu-
ity. 
Relationship negotiation 
The concept of collective construction of a situation also 
explains those instances of indirect speech that are viewed 
as cases of relationship negotiation by Pinker and col-
leagues. These authors rely on a taxonomy proposed by 
Alan Fiske (1992), who classifies human relationships in 
four categories (i.e., dominance, communality, reciprocity, 
and market pricing), which represent different resource dis-
tribution patterns. Many cases of indirect speech, like in 
particular those motivated by politeness, can be explained as 
efforts to deprive a communicative act of certain presump-
tions that are incompatible with the relationship holding 
between the speaker and the hearer. For example, the indi-
rect request 
(9)  “Can you reach the salt?” 
is explained as the speaker’s attempt to avoid conveying the 
presumption of dominance over the hearer that would nor-
mally accompany a direct imperative. 
Fiske’s scheme may be too basic to explain the complex-
ity of human relationships. But even if one accepts it, taking 
the deontic dimension into account is still necessary: to be 
constitutive of a stable interpersonal relationship, a pattern 
of resource distribution must be accepted by the relevant 
agents; but acceptance is a form of joint commitment, and 
as such generates rights, obligations and entitlements. Inter-
personal relationships can thus be viewed as situation com-
ponents that are intrinsically deontic and actively co-
constructed by the interacting agents (typically over a series 
of previous interactions). 
We can now apply this view to explain the use of Utter-
ance 9 to make a request. In a situation involving reciproc-
ity, like for example a social dinner, an agent has the right to 
receive certain forms of support from another agent, pro-
vided that giving such support has a reasonable cost. In a 
situation of dominance, on the contrary, services are 
claimed irrespective of their costs (at least within certain 
limits). Inquiring about the hearer’s ability to reach the salt 
without having to leave his place at the table allows the 
speaker to signal that she would like the hearer to pass the 
salt as part of an interaction carried out within a relationship 
of reciprocity, rather than within one of dominance. 
Conclusions 
We have proposed to regard communicative acts as actions 
by which agents create or otherwise manipulate deontic af-
fordances in concrete situations. Typically, communicative 
acts produce deontic affordances at two different levels: at 
the ‘illocutionary’ level, what is offered to the hearer is to 
participate in the creation of joint meaning; at the ‘perlocu-
tionary’ level, what is offered is to engage in a joint project 
with the speaker. 
Joint meaning is regarded as a special case of joint com-
mitment, to wit, the joint commitment to believe that a cer-
tain type of communicative act has been performed. A joint 
commitment to a belief (i.e., a group belief) has an impor-
tant property: it operates as desire-independent reasons for 
action even if conflicting individual or common beliefs are 
entertained by the parties of the joint commitment. In our 
view, this property is the key to understanding the logic of 
indirect speech. 
In this paper we have only scratched the surface of a huge 
problem, and much further research is needed before we can 
propose a satisfactory theory of situated communication 
based on the deontic notion of joint commitment. In particu-
lar, we believe that it will be important to understand what 
elements of mental architecture underlie the human ability 
to form joint commitments, and more generally desire-
independent reasons for action, which appear to go beyond 
the epistemic and volitional components of cognition that 
have been studied so far in Cognitive Science (see Carassa 
et al., 2008, for a first step in this direction). 
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